The Effect of Independent Audit Quality on the Quality of financial Disclosure - Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange by Paydarmansh, Navid
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.17, 2014 
 
225 
The Effect of Independent Audit Quality on the Quality of 
financial Disclosure - Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange 
 
Navid Paydarmansh1*      Mehdi Salehi2      Mehdi Moradi3       Matina Khorrami4 
1. Master of Accounting, Ferdowsi University, Mashhad, Iran. 
2. Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economic and Business Administration, Ferdowsi 
University, Mashhad, Iran. 
3.associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economic and Business Administration, Ferdowsi 
University, Mashhad, Iran. 
4. Master of Accounting, Azad University, Mashhad, Iran. 
 
Abstract 
Users of financial statements rely solely on the information released by the company. As quality information is 
more, users get better decisions. Auditing also is one of the tools of discosure information. This study is ranged 
from 2008 to 2013 for firms listed in Tehran stock exchange. Audit quality is the independent variable in this 
study and measure by six factors. Dependent variable is the quality of financial disclosure. Study has six 
hypotheses models is multiple regression and software used is Eviews version 8. The results demonstrated that 
there is no ralationship between auditor industry specialization, auditor tenure, audit fee income of the audit firm, 
to quality of information. But there is a significant relationship between auditing firm antiquity and audit quality 
to quality of information. Finally, according to the hypothesis test is concluded that, contrary to popular 
perception, there is no relationship between the quality of audited financial statements and the quality of 
information presented in the financial statements companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
Keywords: Audit Quality, Quality of Disclosure, Audit Fees, Auditor Industry Specialization 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
The world stage due to technological advances, constantly seeking to expand and innovate. Undoubtedly, the 
information revolution has had a significant impact on the way we live and work. Professional and business 
world of today has changes a lot. Globalization extends not only to trade, but also to the various professions . 
This means that increase the demand for more attention on the result of professional works and may not be rely 
on traditional methods. 
 Audit profession is no exception from this case. According to topic of separation between ownership 
from management, discussion of corporate governance and related theories that have been proposed such as 
agency theory, stakeholder theory and other theories,  this is necessary need to audit financial statements  of 
corporations. 
Audit provides double added value for financial statements reported, because the results of the study  
report the relevance and reliability of financial statements [19]. An independent audit firm with expertise , able 
to recognize misrepresented financial statement items and can be influence on his client compared to its correct 
represent, so the result of that , dependable financial information to be reported. Audit with more quality 
improves the accuracy of the information provided, and allow to investors that estimate more accurate than in 
company[9]. 
Consequently, the quality of audit due to represent more quality information in financial statements. Di 
Anjelo defined audit quality as the two probability. First that is auditor detect defect of accounting system of 
client. Second that is reports that defect[14]. Discover of defect, measures audit quality in the form of auditor's 
knowledge and ability. While that report it depends on the auditor's incentives for disclosure. Quantity , quality 
and timeliness of information  that is disclosed by management of company, are one of the important of decision 
support tools by investment. When information through the financial statements is offered to the public, this 
information review and analysis by traders, investors and analysts. Accordingly, decide  for purchase and sale of 
corporate shares. Capital owners, creditors, government and other users of financial reports of companies for 
deciding in purchasing, sale, keeping stock, Loans, evaluate managers' performance and another important 
economic decisions need the reliable, relevant and quality financial information. The overall, investors when 
invest  in an economic unit that at first have sufficient information about it (including financial information) and 
second to make sure this information. The creditors without information about the financial position and 
financial performance of a single cant share their financial resources. so, expected quality of disclosure provided 
may be more effective about decisions and evaluation of users. 
According to the basic assumptions of agency theory between the owner and the agent there are 
potential conflicts of interest. So, to deal with such conflict, different control mechanisms are designed. 
Mechanisms of corporate control are tools that company management measures in order to encourage alignment 
with the interests of investors. Information disclosed as part of the control mechanism investors invested 
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companies have contributed to the discipline manager, This encourages managers so, step in the interests of 
shareholders and improve performance of company [6]. 
Disclosure is one of the accounting principles and according to this principle, all information relating 
to the Company's activities appropriate and timely manner, can be available to different groups of users. In fact, 
the main purposes of the disclosure, are helping users in decision relating to investments, interpretation of 
corporate financial status, evaluating management performance and prediction of future cash flows. In this 
regard all the important facts of the economic must be properly and are fully disclosed, to provide a decision and 
possibly to avoid confusion. As a result, the quality of information disclosed is very important. As we will see, 
quality audit conducted Can have an influence on the disclosure of financial statements. The problem considered 
in this research also examined the relationship between audit quality and the quality of information provided. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
Economic decision always for rational decisions need for high data reliability. By providing this information are 
only monopoly companies and firms and users of this information rely solely on the information released. As a 
result, there is always a requirement for companies to publish information to users and decision makers that 
could be relevant to a decision. As a result, the governments requirements for disclosure of information 
maintained by the enterprise users. Volk states that many issues have an impact on the amount of information 
such as competitiveness of the market to the extent that such disclosure; his interest in the company to disclose 
more information to attract more capital, the internal structure of the company and inability fraudulent reporting 
(corporate governance); Review of financial reports by experts (independent audit) and so on [35]. High quality 
financial reporting and disclosure, has a significant impact on the decisions of users of corporate information. 
The following review will examine audit quality and the quality of information disclosure. 
 
AUDITING AND AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory indicates that the conflict between owners and managers, contrast is somewhat reduced by the 
Financial Reporting. Accountants say stewardship(or accountability to business owners) to this type of routine 
reporting. The Audit Committee of the fundamental concepts of Accountants (1973) about the role of the audit, 
noted the create value by audit and the main beneficiaries of this added value as users of the audit report. Result 
audit have a significant impact on the financial statements. 
 Full disclosure requires that Planning and preparation of financial statements so that a more accurate 
picture of the economic events that have an impact on the economic units to be provided and also contains 
information that may be useful for a typical investment and thereby  does not mislead the reader. The obvious 
principle of full disclosure means that any important information that interest is an ordinary investor should not 
be removed or hidden [4]. The discovery of unintentional and intentional omissions or errors are the 
responsibility of the independent auditor. So the independent auditor with a service to users of the information 
provided will result in an obligation to disclose enough information by company. 
 
AUDIT QUALITY 
Audit quality is an important issue that considered by various interest groups in the company, the audit scope and 
capital market. Because audit quality is barely visible in practice, research in this area has always been faced 
with many problems. 
Definitions related to audit quality 
One of the most common definitions of quality audit, which is defined by Di Angelo (1981) is 
presented. He audit quality is defined as: Market assessment of the likelihood that the auditor (1) detect 
significant distortions of the financial statements or employers accounting system and (2) report significance 
distort. distortions of the probability that the auditor will discover depends the importance of auditor 
competence, and the possibility that the auditor should report the discovery of of misstatement, the auditor 
independence. This definition is based on the assumption that the users' perception of audit quality (market 
inference), is indicative of the actual quality of the audit. 
Titman and Troman define audit quality, accuracy and integrity of information audit quality is 
accuracy and integrity of information that placed after auditing the investors[34]. 
Palmrose define audit quality i in terms of the amount of accredited auditors. Since the purpose of the 
audit, make sure about the financial statements, therefore, audited financial statement audit quality means being 
free of the distortions is important. This definition emphasizes the results of the audit[30]. 
A fundamental problem in the definition of audit quality is differentiation between audit quality and 
audit quality. Many studies did not distinguish any difference between these two terms and are often used to 
make them equal to each other. The overall quality of audit services to audit quality as defined by the audit firm 
audits. In other words, the quality of auditor is based on the concept of quality auditing Institute, while audit 
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quality is based on the actual quality of each audit project. Thus, the distinction between these two concepts is 
essential in research related to audit quality. 
 
AUDIT QUALITY IN THIS STUDY 
In this study audit quality components introduce as follows: 
Auditor industry specialization, auditor tenure, audit firm rank, Auditing firm antiquity, audit fee and audit firm 
revenue 
 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE QUALITY 
According to the conceptual frameworks that expressed by organizations to develop accounting standards and 
theoretical principles in recent decades, The main purpose of accounting and financial reporting is provide useful 
information for economic decision-making by users of financial statements (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, 1978). Disclosure of information by companies in the financial reports are also important components of 
the research. High quality of disclosure and information asymmetry leads to more coordination between 
managers and investors in connection with investment decisions. In addition, disclosure of information 
asymmetry due to the low quality, will result the wrong choice [2]. In the accounting literature use from several 
structures such as suitability, integrity, knowledge providers and timeliness as a representative of disclosure 
quality. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Studies the scope of audit quality research di Angelo began in 1981. He divides audit quality in his research in 
two parts of deficiencies discovered employer accounting system and reporting that. A few years later Libya and 
Frederick review audit quality from auditors perspective. They conclude that from the perspective of audit, 
economic incentives and auditors ability is impressive to audit quality. They also announced that experienced 
professional auditors have greater understanding of mistakes in preparing the financial statements that this can 
increase the quality of audit decisions[26]. Three years later, Davidson and Neu defined auditor audit quality as 
the ability to discover and report the discovery of material misstatement and also by the net manipulating[13]. 
Background investigations will be published in the following separately for independent variables: 
 
AUDITOR INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION 
The group audit firms in an industry that has many employers are more able to understand the risks specific to 
the industry. After the Davidson study, in 2003, Myers and others, state the amount of auditor's care and the 
ability to monitor the tenure as quantitative indicators to measure the quality of the audit. They concluded 
Whatever tenure is greater, his understanding of the client and his expertise in specific industries and enhance 
audit quality will be higher. By observing the relative market share of audit firms that serve a particular industry, 
can be realized to the extent of audit firm industry expertise. The company holds a more of market share, has 
higher specialized knowledge about the industry [27]. The results of research conducted by Falatah, indicating 
that higher auditor tenure increases knowledge and expertise in the industry and the client will enhance audit 
quality [16]. Using these two variables in other research as the influence of Research auditor tenure and auditors' 
industry expertise on earnings quality Ferdinand et al concluded if the auditor expertise industry is low, As a 
result, the relationship between auditor tenure longer and higher quality of earnings, will be stronger, and vice 
versa [17]. Hasas Yegane and Azinfar conclude Audit quality is associated with the size of the audit firm. Their 
research indicate that there is an significant inverse relation between audit quality and auditor size [20]. Also, 
Namazi et al examine the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. In their study use auditor 
size and auditor tenure criteria. The results of their study indicate that in general, there is a weak positive 
relationship between the auditor and auditor tenure and earnings management metrics [28]. Therefore, the audit 
firm industry market share of activity (industry specialist auditor) has an impact on audit quality. Thus the 
specialized industry accounting include first hypothesis of this research: 
First hypothesis: There is a significant relationship between auditor industry specialization and the quality of 
financial disclosure. 
 
AUDITOR TENURE (continuing auditor selection) 
Independence is the foundation of auditing, and auditing, without independence, has no value. Public trust and 
capital markets to auditor is because of his independence. Therefore, the factors threatening the independence 
should always be examined. In this regard, one of the areas in recent decades has been discussed is auditor 
tenure. Studies show that having experience with a specific employer will enhance audit quality. Also more 
likely to have better information about to ensure how auditee work and business processes. In a survey 
conducted by Myers and colleagues they conclude that high office during the audit is cause the auditor's 
knowledge and expertise in the industry of auditee. By Carcelo and Nagy results indicate that high levels of 
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auditor tenure will enhance audit quality [7]. Ferdinand, et al in the study as the effect of auditor tenure and 
auditors' industry expertise on earnings quality concluded that if the auditor industry specialization is low, In that 
case, the relationship between auditor tenure longer and higher quality of earnings, it will be stronger, and vice 
versa [17]. But Sajjadi et al. argues by 3 reason that the choice of continuing auditor reduce independence and 
audit quality: First, the nature of the audit work is such that provides the auditor of continuing association with 
the entity's management. The auditor long-term relationship with the employer caused by getting too close 
auditor to employer management and created an intimacy relationship between them. This close relationship may 
lead to ignoring the distortions discovered during the audit by auditor. Second, the continuing of choice auditor, 
lead to monotonous and repetitive the audit work for auditors, and this reduces the auditor's professional 
competence. Third, the desire to have a long term income from fee-site audit, the auditor may be retain to in his 
position, consider client satisfaction as one of the factors influencing their decisions [31]. Consequently, the 
second hypothesis of this study is as follows:  
Second hypothesis: There is a significant relationship between the independent auditor tenure and the quality of 
financial disclosure,. 
 
AUDIT FIRM QUALITY 
Large audit firms have a high reputation and are usually more cost, and they spent their auditors have stronger 
control. Dopuch and Simunic believe that large audit firms to improve their audit quality, make great 
investments [15]. Craswell and his colleagues concluded that the investigative audit firm has higher prices and 
they care more for their known and reputation [11]. Impact on audit quality and audit under the supervision of 
renowned audit firm and promote the reputation of the audit firm. Consequently, the third hypothesis of this 
study are presented as follows: 
Third hypothesis: There is a significant relationship between the rating agencies (reputation and quality) and the 
quality of financial information disclosure. 
 
AUDITING FIRM ANTIQUIDITY 
Libya and Frederick have found that the greater the extent of auditors, their perceptions of the various distortions 
increased in the financial statements [26]. Hence, they concludes that decision quality of auditor improves with 
increased experience of audit. Thus, auditor is much more ancient, Will offer better service to the community. As 
a result, the fourth research hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Fourth hypothesis: There is a significant relationship between the average years of audit institution and the 
quality of financial information disclosure. 
 
AUDIT FEE 
Audit fees, reflects the economic costs of efficient audit. In their study, as relationship between the quality of 
audit reports and audit fees examine the relationship between audit quality and audit fees. Their results indicate 
that there is a significant relationship audit quality and audit fees. Consequently, considering the impact of audit 
fees on audit quality, so our fourth hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
Fifth hypothesis: There is a significant relationship between the Audit fees and the quality of financial 
information disclosure. 
 
REVENUE AUDIT FIRM 
We assume that if an audit firm has higher quality, more and larger employers want their company audited by 
this audit firm. Then, the sixth hypothesis of this study are presented as follows: 
Sixth hypothesis: there is a significant relationship between the income of the audit firm and the quality of 
financial disclosure. 
The backgrounds related to disclosure quality present in the follow. Research has not seen that examines the 
relationship between audit quality and the quality of disclosure. 
Lang and Landholm findings indicate that there is a significant positive correlation between the quality of 
disclosure and corporate profits [24]. Gelb and Zarvin findings indicate that firms with higher disclosure quality 
compared to firms with lower disclosure quality, Have a higher price than the current and future profits [18]. 
Lang and Landhlm findings indicate that the quality of information disclosure in corporate profits lead to more 
accurate prediction [25]. Botosan conclude from his research that improved disclosure reduces the cost of capital 
[5]. Jensen and et al findings indicate that firms with lower disclosure quality have better future performance 
than other companies in its industry [23]. Chi, study the effect of disclosure quality on the performance of 
Taiwanese companies. The results indicate that there is a significant positive correlation between disclosure 
quality and firm performance [10]. Findings. Setayesh and et al findings indicate that there is a significant 
relationship between disclosure quality and cost of capital is the company's current and future common stock 
[32]. Noravesh and Hossaini study correlation between the quality of disclosure and earnings management. Their 
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results indicate that there is a negative relationship between earnings management and corporate disclosure 
quality [29].  
 
RESAEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research is in the field of PAT (Positive Accounting Theory) researchs. And in terms of aim is among 
applied research descriptive – correlation. The reason that this research will lead to the applied research, 
According to audit quality to increase the quality of information provided and make better decisions for lenders.  
 
SAMPLE 
Community research firms in Tehran Stock Exchange for the 5-year period of 1387 to 1391. Companies that 
have trading break remove from the research community. Also due to the audit fee variable in research, and not 
to disclose this fee by some companies, the companies that disclosed this variable selected in the sample. After 
the above restrictions, remained a sample of 214 companies, and with using the Cochran formula, selected 126 
companies. However, due to the low number of firms that disclose the audit fees in the financial statements, we 
examine all companies then 345 words in 69 companies - companies select as samples. 
 
VARIABLES AND RESEARCH MODEL 
In this research use the combination of data integration and data regression model (joint effects model), the data 
are analyzed by the software Eviews version 8. the research model is: 
DISCLOSURE = β0 + β1SPECIALITYi,t   + β2PERIODi,t + β3 EXPERIMENT i,t    + β4 QUALITY i,t + β5 
FEE i,t    + β6 REVENUE i,t + β7 SIZE i,t + β8 LEVERAGE i,t + β9 EV/EBIT i,t + εi 
 
Βi is coefficients of the model variables and εi is the model error that by increasing the sample size, reduce to 
zero. The variables in the model present below. 
Measurement of independent variables the independent variable in this study is the audit quality that measure by 
the auditor industry specialization, auditor tenure, audit fee, audit firm quality, Auditing firm antiquity and audit 
firm revenue. 
SPECIALITY: auditor industry specialization expertise reagent concentration and skills of auditors in the 
industry and the ability to detect threats and risks associated with the industry. Market share is measured by 
auditor industry specialization. In this way, if the auditor's market share is greater, specialization audit firm in 
that industry is more. Auditors' market share calculate as follows: 
Market share auditors = 					
								
	
					
				
 
Companies are considered as industry professionals that their market share of is more than 
[ 
								
× (

)].  
PERIOD
  
: Audit firm tenure, the number of years that the company has a duty to investigate. We measure 
auditor tenure period, we know the number of years an audit firm auditing a company's liability more knowledge 
criterion with firm.  
EXPERIMENT: Criteria for measurement auditing firm antiquity, is a year in that audit firm certified public 
accountants and accepted to join the community. Year-old auditor for audit institutions are not considered, but 
since the certified public accountants accepted criterion practice. 
FEE: Audit fees is consist of audit work done at the rate of payment for the cost of the employer company, that 
extract in part of general and administrative of the financial statements notes attached. 
QUALITY: To assess the quality of audit institutions, we use audit privileges granted to the quality of 
institutions. The Awards announce by the Iranian Society of CPAs. Using these points, we classify 4 categories 
of quality (1) to poor (4).  
Revenue audit firm: Revenue audit institution extract by using how much they do and comes from the 
Declaration cpa Iran. 
Measurement of the dependent variable 
DISCLOSURE: The dependent variable in this study is the quality of the disclosure of listed companies in 
Tehran Stock Exchange. To measure this variable, we use the points allocated to these companies.  
Covariates: 
SIZE: Size in this study is considered as one of the covariates. Size acquire by calculating the logarithm of total 
assets of a company. We believe that larger companies are more than willing to disclose more to do.  
LEVERAGE: Another control variables in this study consider the financial leverage. Financial leverage 
compute by dividing total debt by total equity participation in any enterprise.  
EV/EBIT: This is the third control variable in this study. The purpose of the EV value of the firm (Equity 
Value), and the same EBIT Earnings before interest and tax deductions. Jerhard and Lee use this as an auxiliary 
variable in his research surrounding the disclosure quality and audit. 
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RESEARCH FINDINGS 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC 
 initially, before testing the hypotheses, calculate descriptive statistics, including mean, standard deviation and 
variance of variables is shown in table 1:  
descriptive statistics - Table 1 
Variable Number of years - Min Max Mean standard deviation 
DIS. 345 0.00 99.00 81.37 16.19 
TENURE 345 1.00 14.00 5.461 3.991 
SIZE 345 11.39 12.81 11.95 0.345 
LEVERAGE 345 0.080 4.96 1.902 1.156 
EV/EBIT 345 -33.65 56.57 7.032 12.50 
FEE 345 1.00 912.00 3.865 164.2 
QUALITY 345 1.00 2.00 1.125 0.336 
SPECIAL 345 0.00 1.00 0.750 0.436 
REVENUE 345 1 4 2.831 0.548 
 
Results of hypothesis testing  
As mentioned in the literature, the aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between audit quality, 
including auditor tenure, auditor industry specialization, audit fee, income of the audit firm and audit firm quality 
on the quality of corporate financial disclosure. Follow we investigate the simultaneous effects of variables of 
audit quality on the quality disclosure. To test this hypothesis, we first investigated the normal distribution data 
using the Kolmogorov - Smirnov test, the results show normal distribution of the data. 
TESTS IS PANEL DATA 
CHOW TEST 
Chow (1960) announced a test that use for the choice between OLS model data integration (fusion) and fixed 
effects models. Assumptions of this model are: 
H0 = µ1 = µ2 = … = µn-1 = 0 
H1 = Not 
µ is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the fixed effects model. In this test, the null hypothesis represent 
identical coefficients and intercept of the companies studied and hence reject the null hypothesis suggests using 
panel data (Panel) and failure to reject the null hypothesis suggests using ordinary least squares integration. The 
test results show in table No. (2) which reflects the need to reject the null hypothesis and using panel data fixed 
effects method for this group of companies.  
Table No. (2) -Test period fixed effects- Chow test   
     
     Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
     
     Period F 6.872389 (4,327) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 27.605801 4 0.0000 
     
     
 
BERUSH – PAGAN TEST 
Berush and Pagan In 1980 use the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for integrated data model in contrast the 
random effects of bilateral. Using this method, obtain the maximum likelihood estimate. Assumptions for this 
test is as follows (36): 
H0 : δa2 = 0 
H1 : δa2> 0 
 
That in these assumptions δa2 represents the effect of on the cross-sectional variance estimated of the random 
effect model. In this test, the null hypothesis means to better integrate data model and reject the null hypothesis 
means there is a random effects model. After the test using software Stata, the results of this test provide in table 
No. (2) that reject the null hypothesis, which suggests the necessity of using panel data is the random effect for 
this group of companies.  
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Table No. (3) - Berush - Pagan 
Var                            sd=sqrt(Var) Estimated results 
0.798065                       0.557432 
0.083321                       0.327820 
0.231504                       0.415029 
Ln Disclosure 
e 
u 
Test: Var(u)=0 
Chi2(1)=547.82 
Prob>chi2=0.0003 
 
HUSMAN TEST 
According to the Chow test confirmed the presence of fixed effects model, now must two methods of estimating 
panel data fixed effect and random effect of the method of selection. For this purpose, the Husman test statistic 
using panel data. Assumptions of this model are: (36) 
H0: estimators of fixed effects and random effects estimators are consistent (no difference)  
H1: There is a fixed effect model and random effect model is rejected 
 
Husman test results provide in table No. (3) indicate acceptance of the null hypothesis that the use of either a 
fixed or random effects method assuming that the difference between a random effect was used in this study.  
Table (4) - Hausman test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 16.035772 10 0.0986 
     
     
 
Now to measure the significance of the regression model we use Fisher statistics 95% confidence level. Also we 
use t-test for test the significance of each of the coefficients. And the autocorrelation between the errors of the 
model review by testing the Durbin – Watson. If Durbin- Watson statistic is between 1.5 to 2.5 was supposed 
lack of correlation between the model errors. The results state in table (5): 
Table No. (5) - significantly Model 
 Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.226 Mean dependent var 59.84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.192 S.D. dependent var 25.51 
S.E. of regression 22.92 Akaike info criterion 9.145 
Sum squared resid 171.6 Schwarz criterion 9.313 
Log likelihood -154.8 Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.212 
F-statistic 6.820 Durbin-Watson stat 1.147 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
     
     
 
Statistic Durbin - Watson (802/1) is between 5/1 and 5/2 that indicate that the correlation between the errors will 
be rejected and regression can be used to test this hypothesis. The above test results show that the fitted 
regression model is accepted at the 5% level of significance (0.047 <0.05) and it is possible the ability to 
implement and measure the variables used in this model fitted the data. Now, according to hypothesis testing 
model assumptions as described above the test results state in table (6): 
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Table No. (6) - Model test research hypotheses 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     TENURE 0.033 0.199 0.166 0.867 
FEE 3.145 5.904 0.531 0.595 
QUALITY 3.577 3.617 0.989 0.023 
SPECIAL -2.986 2.910 -1.026 0.305 
REVENUE -3.294 1.272 -2.589 0.099 
ANTIQUITY -0.304 0.223 -1.363 0.033 
SIZE 2.396 2.679 0.894 0.371 
LEVERAGE -0.120 0.134 -0.892 0.372 
EV/EBIT -0.002 0.001 -1.666 0.096 
C 35.85 31.71 1.130 0.259 
     
     
 
According to above describe the valuation assumptions 1 to 6. as observe is not significant the audit firm 
industry specialization variables (first hypothesis) (0.72> 0.05). Therefore, not approve the first of the study 
(there is a significant relationship between audit firm industry specialization and quality of information 
disclosure).The tenure variable (second hypothesis) is not significant (0.99> 0.05). In conclusion, also reject the 
second research hypothesis (there is a significant relationship between tenure and the quality of information). . 
However, there is variable quality auditor (third hypothesis) is statistically significant (0.04 <0.05). 
Consequently, accept the third hypothesis of this study (there is a significant relationship between institutional 
quality audit and quality of information). Also antiquity of variable of audit firm (Hypothesis IV) is significant 
(0.02 <0.05). Therefore accepted the fourth hypothesis of research (there is a significant relationship between 
age and experience of the audit firm and the quality of information). But the audit fee variable (fifth) is not 
significant (0.10> 0.05), therefore the fifth  hypothesis (there is a significant relationship between audit fee and 
quality of information disclosure) not accepted.  
 
CONCLUSION 
With the rejection of the first hypothesis as the relationship between auditor industry expertise and the quality of 
information disclosure, we found that companies in Tehran Stock Exchange never consider the specialist audit 
firm for the firm auditor's choice. Although it can be a great help in order to identify risks and threats to the 
company. Because a audit firm that done many of its  Reviews in a particular industry, has better knowledge and 
greater than the risks of internal and external pressures on the industry (and state law). 
With the rejection of the second hypothesis of this study, a relationship between auditor tenure and the 
quality of information disclosure, this result can be taken that if an audit firm auditing a company having more 
years, Companies are less willing to disclose relevant information. This problem can be derived from this is that 
due to a long term relationship with an audit client, and establishing friendly relations and reduced auditor 
independence, Employer is not willing to disclose information and thus the quality of corporate disclosure falls.  
the third hypothesis of this study as the relationship between institutional quality audit and quality of 
information, Can be inferred that get good disclosure quality rating by the certified public accountants to audit 
institutions have been performed with good accuracy. Because auditors are high quality companies to disclose 
their information enough to not question the quality and credibility. 
With the accepted the fourth hypothesis as the relationship between age and experience of the research 
institution and the quality of information, we conclude that of audit firms which are high the history and 
experience, do not allow to companies for less than enough disclosure so long as society does not lose its 
credibility as an expert to look at them. 
With rejecting the fifth hypothesis of this study that there is a significant relationship between the 
auditing fee and quality of information, conclude that prolongation audit and number that used for auditing 
employer thereby increasing the cost of the audit, can not be effective in increasing the quality of information 
disclosed.  
With rejecting the sixth hypothesis of this study that there is a significant relationship between the 
auditing fee and quality of information, conclude that more jobs audit firms (which leads to more revenue) does 
not affect the quality, and audit firms to choose the number of things they do not care. Finally, according to the 
picture number (7) we discuss final conclusion: 
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Table (7) - Conclusion 
Number of hypotheses Significant Test results 
1 0.305 Reject the hypothesis 
2 0.867 Reject the hypothesis 
3 0.023 Accept the hypothesis 
4 0.033 Accept the hypothesis 
5 0.595 Reject the hypothesis 
6 0.099 Reject the hypothesis  
 
According to the results of figure (7), and the rejection and acceptance of our assumptions are reasonable, unlike 
the researchers and the community, there is no significant relashtionship between the quality of audited financial 
statements and quality of information disclosure.  
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